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Introduction 
 
 
Egypt’s Nile Water Policy under Sisi 
Security Interests Promote Rapprochement with Ethiopia 
Tobias von Lossow and Stephan Roll 
Under Abdel Fatah al-Sisi Egypt has moderated its stance in the Nile water dispute with 
Ethiopia, the most important state upstream. In the conflict over the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD), Cairo is now seeking cooperation rather than conflict. But this 
rapprochement is not driven by any fundamental reversal in Egypt’s Nile water policy. 
Instead, Cairo recognises that its options are restricted by the advanced state of dam 
construction. In addition it sees Ethiopia as an increasingly important partner, espe-
cially in matters of regional security. While Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict over distribu-
tion and usage of the water is currently on the back-burner, the issue is by no means 
resolved. 
 
After decades of intransigence reality has 
caught up with Egypt’s Nile water policy: 
on the river’s upper reaches, Ethiopia is 
working flat-out on Africa’s largest hydro-
electric scheme. The dam is close to half-
finished, and the $4.7 billion project is 
scheduled to be completed in 2017, when 
it will supply about 6,000 MW of electricity 
(more than 15,000 GWh/year) to meet 
domestic demand and for regional export. 
The Nile is Egypt’s lifeblood, supplying 
more than 90 percent of its water needs. And 
more than 80 percent of the Nile water that 
reaches Egypt originates from the Ethio-
pian Highlands (the Blue Nile). This depend-
ency has repeatedly given rise to provoca-
tion and tensions between Cairo and Addis 
over questions of water usage. Despite rela-
tively successfully coordinating and moni-
toring practical cooperation between all 
Nile riparian states since 1999, the inter-
nationally supported Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI) has been unable to resolve the politi-
cal sticking points. The start of construc-
tion on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (GERD) in 2011 dynamised the con-
flict. Even if Ethiopia stresses that the mega-
dam is designed exclusively to produce 
power, Egypt fears that the river’s flow 
could be reduced. Above all, in a scenario 
that Cairo has always regarded as an exis-
tential threat, Egypt will lose sole control 
over its central water resource. 
Negotiations as Last Resort 
In the past Egypt always applied all possible 
diplomatic leverage to prevent any develop-
ment of Ethiopia’s water infrastructure. This 
strict course was also of great importance 
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domestically, in order to feed an image 
of external strength and to distract from 
deficits in the maintenance and expansion 
of its own water infrastructure. Cairo pro-
claimed – often extremely aggressively – 
Egypt’s exclusive right to use the waters of 
the Nile, on the basis of colonial-era treaties 
that de facto deny any such rights to the 
other ten riparian states (all apart from 
Sudan). In that sense, the Ethiopian dam 
project symbolises the ultimate failure of 
the Egyptian water policy. 
Egypt initially protested vehemently 
against GERD, sought to mobilise interna-
tionally and to negotiate with Ethiopia at 
least to limit its size. But since President 
Sisi took office in June 2014 Cairo has 
followed a surprisingly conciliatory line. 
Three-party talks with Sudan and Ethiopia, 
initially abandoned in early 2014, resumed 
in the autumn. But above all the character 
and thrust of discussions have changed 
significantly in comparison to earlier con-
sultations: it is no longer about whether or 
in what form GERD will be built, but how 
the ecological and socioeconomic conse-
quences for each state will be measured, 
assessed and addressed. In early 2015 the 
three countries agreed to commission an 
international consulting firm to prepare 
recommendations and monitor their im-
plementation. In a historic departure from 
its previous stance, Cairo’s consent to this 
move implies acceptance of the Ethiopian 
dam. 
Sisi’s cooperative attitude to the GERD 
question is motivated by the insight that 
the project can no longer be stopped by 
sabre-rattling. Too determinedly is Addis 
Ababa pushing ahead with its largely self-
funded prestige project. Given the geo-
graphical distance between the two coun-
tries and the poor state of its armed forces, 
Egypt has no military option (even if Cairo 
has suggested otherwise in the past). Nor 
can it count on support from its most 
important allies, the United States and the 
Gulf states, over this issue. For Washington 
– and Europe – Ethiopia is the central part-
ner in East Africa for the “war on terror”. 
The Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi 
Arabia, have pronounced economic inter-
ests in the Ethiopian agricultural sector 
and import food from the region. So politi-
cal pressure on Addis Ababa to abandon its 
water infrastructure expansion cannot be 
expected from those quarters. There is con-
sequently little mileage for Egypt in an 
internationalisation of the conflict, such as 
calling on the UN Security Council – as it 
has indirectly threatened in the past. 
That leaves returning to the negotiating 
table as Sisi’s only remaining option for 
minimising the foreseeable negative impact 
of GERD on Egypt’s water supply. Cairo’s 
goal in direct talks with Addis Ababa is not 
a fundamental reordering of water rights 
but achieving the greatest possible conces-
sions for the time when the reservoir is 
filled. For its volume is enormous: at 74 bil-
lion cubic metres it will contain close to the 
total annual flow of the Nile (84 billion cubic 
metres). The two sides have yet to reach 
agreement about how this process will be 
staggered. 
Economic and Security Interests 
The Egyptian change of strategy is driven 
by more than negotiating tactics. By taking 
a moderate line on the Nile issue, Sisi hopes 
to open bilateral relations in other policy 
areas. In recent months Egypt has repeated-
ly pointed to the potential for intensifying 
economic cooperation. And at least since 
2010 an increase in trade and investment 
flows between the two countries has indeed 
been observed. Politically influential Egyp-
tian corporations like Qalaa Holdings and 
cable manufacturer Elsewedy Electric have 
made significant investments in Ethiopia 
(the most populous country in East Africa) 
and are therefore likely to have been lob-
bying in Cairo for an easing of political 
relations. 
Expanding security cooperation is likely 
of even greater importance to Cairo. In 
view of the Ethiopian campaign against the 
Islamist al-Shabaab militias in Somalia, 
the Sisi regime sees the no less authoritari-
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 an Ethiopian leadership as a natural part-
ner in its own struggle against Islamist 
groups. But above all Egypt possesses a 
strong strategic interest in the security 
situation in the southern Red Sea. Any 
disruption to shipping through the Bab 
al-Mandab Strait would immediately im-
pact traffic to the Suez Canal, which is 
one of Egypt’s most important sources of 
revenue. The current Canal expansion – 
Sisi’s economic prestige project, which it is 
hoped will contribute billions of dollars in 
revenue to the overstretched state budget – 
has in fact increased the strategic relevance 
of this shipping route for Egypt in recent 
months. Above all the civil war in Yemen 
and its possible repercussions on control 
of shipping lanes to the north of the Bab 
al-Mandab have worried the Egyptian 
leadership for months. Cairo fears that 
state collapse in Yemen could enable mili-
tant Islamist groups to disrupt shipping 
north of the Bab al-Mandab, and is also 
increasingly concerned that Iran could gain 
indirect control over this vital shipping 
route, through the rise of the Huthi move-
ment in Yemen and by intensifying its 
relations with Eritrea. Especially in light 
of the latest developments in Yemen, Egypt 
appears to possess no almost alternative 
to closing ranks with Ethiopia, as the only 
regional power in East Africa with an effec-
tive army. 
Conclusion: No End to the Nile 
Water Conflict 
Germany and its European partners have 
been supporting cross-border cooperation 
in the Nile Basin for years and have worked 
actively for a peaceful resolution of the 
water conflict within the framework of the 
NBI. For them the rapprochement between 
Egypt and Ethiopia is initially good news 
(even if the international mediation initia-
tives played hardly any role). An escalation 
of the Nile Water dispute – especially 
between the two central parties – appears 
to have been averted for the moment by 
Egyptian concessions on the dam project. 
Detail of Nile Basin 
But the Sisi government’s cooperative stance 
should not be confused for a fundamental 
reversal in Egypt’s Nile water policy. De 
facto acceptance of a dam whose construc-
tion has become unstoppable simply repre-
sents an inevitable adaptation of Egyptian 
negotiating strategy to the reality on the 
ground. In addition, a rebalancing of Egyp-
tian security interests also played a decisive 
role in the change of course. 
In no respect does Sisi’s change of strategy 
mean an end to the conflict over distribu-
tion and use of the Nile water resources. 
Any superficial impression that Egypt under 
President Sisi might be more constructive 
in this question than under Hosni Mubarak 
or Mohamed Morsi is misleading. The cur-
rent Egyptian rapprochement with Ethiopia 
is occurring exclusively within the conflict 
arena of GERD, while the broader conflict 
over the fundamental distribution of the 
Nile waters remains unaffected. 
Not least in view of the fundamentally 
nationalist orientation of the Sisi regime, 
there will be little change there in the fore-
seeable future. On the contrary, by including 
its historic water rights in the new Egyp-
tian constitution adopted in summer 2013 
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after the military coup (Article 44), the po-
litical leadership has set a course that will 
strongly restrict its room for manoeuvre 
in the Nile question. So Sisi’s current cost-
benefit calculation, which prioritises good 
relations with Ethiopia over domestic 
instrumentalisation of the water conflict, 
could change at any time. If shortages were 
to occur in the Egyptian water supply Sisi 
could adopt a much more aggressive tone, 
reviving the resource nationalism of past 
times to distract from home-grown in-
adequacies in the modernisation of water 
infrastructure and management. 
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